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CRIMINAL LAW ACCESSORY SHIP AN ACCESSORY
BEFORE THE FACT MAY BE CONVICTED OF A GREATER
CRIME OR DEGREE OF CRIME THAN THE PRINCIPAL. Jones v.
State, 302 Md. 153, 486 A.2d 184 (1985).
One of three defendants was convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder and accessory before the fact to first degree murder.! Of the two
remaining defendants, one previously pled guilty as a principal to second
degree murder, and the remaining defendant, following a first degree
murder conviction, was awaiting a new trial. 2 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in an unreported decision, affirmed the first defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit murder and reversed, sua
sponte, the conviction of accessory before the fact to first degree murder. 3
In doing so, the court perfunctorily followed the common law rule that
prohibits an accessory's conviction of a greater crime than the principal's.4 The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, abrogated the common law rule, holding that an accessory before the fact may be convicted
of a greater crime or degree of crime than the principal. 5
At common law, parties to a felony are classified into four discrete
categories: 6 (1) principals in the first degree are the actual perpetrators
of the crime; (2) principals in the second degree are those who, without
actually committing the offense, aid and abet the perpetrator during the
commission of the crime; (3) accessories before the fact procure, counsel,
or command the principal, but are not present during the commission of
1. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 155,486 A.2d 184, 185 (1985).
2. Jones, 302 Md. at 155, 486 A.2d at 185.
3.Id.
4. Id. Various common law rules protected accessories from capital punishment for
felonious crimes. Among these was the rule that prohibited conviction of an accessory of a greater crime than the principal. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 202, 396
A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
5. Jones, 302 Md. at 161, 486 A.2d at 189. Because the defendant died prior to the
court's decision, the case was moot. Judicial moot ness occurs when "there is no
longer an effective remedy which the court can provide." Hagerstown Reproductive
Health Services v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 272,454 A.2d 846, 848 (1983) (quoting Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md.
324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979)), cert. denied, 103 U.S. 3538 (1983). Prior to
Jones, Maryland case law failed to provide a general rule applicable to the disposition of moot cases. Compare Hagerstown Reproductive Health Services v. Fritz, 295
Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846 (1983) (remanding to intermediate appellate court with directions to vacate the trial court's judgment and remand with directions to dismiss
the case), with National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tucker, 300 Md. 156,476 A.2d
1160 (1984) (per curiam) (dismissing the appeal). The Jones court accepted the majority distinction between appeals of right and discretionary reviews, holding that
the proper disposition of a case that becomes moot during discretionary review is
dismissal of the writ of certiorari rather than dismissal of the entire indictment.
Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158,486 A.2d 184, 187 (1985). In spite of dismissing
the writ, the Jones court considered the merits of the case because there was "an
urgency to establish a rule of future conduct on a matter of important public concern." Id.
6. Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323, 326,499 A.2d 170, 171 (1985); State v. Ward, 284
Md. 189, 196-97,396 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 495-96 (1972).
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the felony; and (4) accessories after the fact provide aid to the principal
in order to impede his apprehension, conviction, or punishment. 7
Capital punishment was originally the exclusive penalty administered to any party convicted of a felony. Certain procedural rules, probably designed to mitigate the harshness of the Ubiquitous death penalty,
emerged from the principal-accessory distinction. 8 First, under the sequence-of-trial rule, an accessory could not be tried, absent his consent,
before the principal was tried, convicted, and sentenced. 9 Second, the
greater-crimes rule prohibited the conviction of an accessory for a greater
crime than his principal. \0 Third, an accessory who incited the perpetration of a felony in one jurisdiction could be tried only in that jurisdiction,
even if the actual crime occurred in a different jurisdiction. I I Finally, a
party could be convicted as principal or accessory only if he was so designated in the pleadings. 12
Certain illogical consequences followed from these procedural
rules. 13 For example, if a principal died without being tried or convicted
of a crime, the accessory, in spite of the palpability of his guilt, was
shielded from prosecution.1 4 Once most felonies were removed from the
capital offense category, however, the primary reason for the principalaccessory distinction ceased to exist. 15 Consequently, virtually every state
7. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197,396 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 6, at 496-98, 522-23; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
736-48 (3d ed. 1982); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **34, 35, 37.
8. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 751-58; see also W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 6 at 499 (identifying the problematic procedural rule that
emerged from the principal-accessory distinction). Because the Jones case concerned
the single rule that an accessory before the fact could not be convicted of a greater
crime or degree of crime than the principal, this casenote will focus primarily on
that rule, with some attention given to the closely related sequence-of-trial rule that
prohibits the trial of an accessory before the trial and conviction of the principal.
9. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
7, at 755; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *323. An additional reason against
trying an accessory prior to the final disposition of the principal was the assumption
that no accessory could exist unless there was a prior judicial determination, via the
conviction cf the principal, that a crime had been committed. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 7, at *4 n. 38. The rule was also thought to prevent the "absurdity" of
acquitting a principal but convicting an accessory. /d. at *323.
10. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *36; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at
757. A rationale proffered for this rule is that an accessory's guilt is derived from the
principal's behavior; therefore, his culpability should not exceed the principal's
guilt. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *36.
II. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 499; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 7, at 753-54.
12. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 499; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 7, at 754-55. This rule required that no variance between charge and proof
exist. Thus, if one was charged as a principal, he could not be convicted on proof
that he was an accessory. See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 18, 86 S.W.2d
1054, 1057 (1935).
13. See State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 192,396 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1978); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 498; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 755-56.
14. State v. McDaniel, 41 Tex. 229, 230 (1874).
15. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 759.
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has statutorily modified the common law accessory-principal distinctions. 16 As a result, the anomalous consequences of the accessoryship
rules have disappeared to a large extent.17
Statutory modifications have not resulted in universal abrogation of
the accessoryship rules. Although practically every jurisdiction permits
an accessory to be tried prior to the principal,18 a minority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the greater-crimes rule. 19 Even so, the majority of reported jurisdictions permit an accessory to be convicted of a
16. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-20 (1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11-16-100, 11-16-110 (1983);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-303 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-301 (1983); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 971 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271 (1979);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-105 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.011 (West 1976); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-2-21 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-221 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 19-1430 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE
ANN. § 41-2-4 (Burns 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.1 (West 1979); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3205 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.02 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:23 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57 (1964);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (West 1969); MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.39 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 971-3 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 45-2-302,45-2-303 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-206 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 195.020 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 626:8 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-13
(1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5-2
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.03
(Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 432 (1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 18, § 18-306 (1983); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-3 (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-331 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-302 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01
(Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4
(1974); VA. CODE § 18.2-18 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020 (1977);
W. VA. CODE § 61-11.7 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1982); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-1-201 (1983); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500
(summarizing the kinds of statutory changes made to the common law distinction
between principals and accessories before the fact); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 7, at 759 (noting that the trend is toward abrogating the distinction between
principals and accessories).
17. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500. Statutory reform has not been
uniform nor has it obviated all the anachronistic procedural consequences of the
common law distinction between accessories and principals. See R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 7, at 759 (describing interpretations of statutes that retain aspects of the common law accessoryship rules).
18. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 6, at 500-01; see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 7, at 759-60 (stating that the unavailability of the principal does not bar
conviction of an accessory before the fact); 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW 177 (1978) (no longer necessary for principal to be convicted prior to accessory's trial). But see Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927) (the court
abused its discretion when it permitted the trial of an accessory before the trial of his
principal when the principal was in custody and prepared for trial); People v.
Wyherk, 347 III. 28, 178 N.E. 890 (1931) (when principal and accessory are tried
together the statute requires the conviction of the principal to sustain the accessory's conviction).
19. See, e.g., Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927); Davis v. State, 267
Ind. 152,368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977); Tomlin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 207, 233 S.W.2d
303, 305 (1950).
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greater crime than the principaJ,2° especially in those jurisdicitons that
have abrogated the distinction between accessories and principals. 21
In an early case, Fleming v. State,22 a defendant-accessory was convicted of murder, although the actual perpetrator previously was convicted only of manslaughter. 23 On appeal, the defendant, although
present during the commission of the murder, argued that he was an
accessory.24 Thus, he claimed the court's instructions, which characterized him as "aiding, abetting, and assisting," erroneously permitted a
conviction of murder because his principal was convicted only of manslaughter. 25 Relying on the statute that abrogated the distinction between
an accessory before the fact and a principal,26 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that an accessory can be convicted of a greater crime than
the principal once the guilt of the principal is established. 27
On the other hand, some jurisdictions retain the greater-crimes
rule. 28 In Davis v. State,29 the defendant's petition for postconviction relief was predicated on the proposition that his conviction as an accessory
before the fact to murder was improper because the subsequent trial of
his principal had resulted in only a conviction for assault and battery.3o
The Supreme Court of Indiana stated that "in a situation where there has
been two separate judicial determinations on the merits of the respective
cases, and where they are contradictory, the law will impose a consis20. See Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561, 424 P.2d 115 (1967). See generally Annot. 9
A.L.R. 4th 972, 993-95 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (for a discussion of the effect of a
conviction of a principal on the disposition of the accessory's case).
21. See Bridges v. State, 263 So.2d 705 (Ala. Crim. App. 1972) (per curiam) (statute
abolishes all distinctions between common law parties and allows an aider and abettor to be convicted of a greater crime than the principal); People v. Hines, 28 Ill.
App.3d 976, 329 N.E.2d 903 (1975) (under the state's common accountability statute an accessory's murder conviction upheld even though perpetrator pled guilty to
only conspiracy to commit murder and armed robbery); State v. Norwood, 217
Kan. 150, 535 P.2d 996 (1975) (citing to statutory authority to support an accessory's conviction to a different crime or degree of crime than his principal); Fleming
v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 108 So. 143 (1926) (accessory convicted of higher degree of
crime than his principal based upon statutory authority).
22. 142 Miss. 872, 108 So. 143 (1926).
23. [d. at 878, 108 So. at 144.
24. [d. at 880, 108 So. at 144.
25. [d.
26. The statute read: "Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the
fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished
as such; and this whether the principal have been previously convicted or not." [d.
The current Mississippi statute is identical to the above. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-3
(1972 & Supp. 1985).
27. Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 881, 108 So. 143, 145 (1926).
28. See Feaster v. State, 175 Ark. 165,299 S.W. 737 (1927); Trozzo v. People, 51 Colo.
323,117 P. 150 (1911); Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152,368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977). See
generally Annot. 9 A.L.R. 4th 972, 995-97 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (discussing case law
supporting the greater-crimes rule).
29. 267 Ind. 152, 368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977).
30. [d. at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 1150.
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tency to their findings."3!
Maryland embraces the common law classification of parties to a
felony,32 and, until recently, the courts adhered to the sequence-of-triaP3
and greater-crimes rules. 34 In State v. Magliano,35 the defendant was
charged as an accessory after the fact to the statutory crime of escape. 36
When the principal died prior to his trial, the defendant, relying on the
sequence-of-trial rule, moved to dismiss the indictment. 37 The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss,38 and the court of special appeals affirmed. 39 In its ruling, the court considered itself bound by Maryland's
constitutional incorporation of the common law of England40 and rejected the argument that the accessoryship rules were anachronistic and
should be ignored. 4! The court intimated dissatisfaction with the sequence-of-trial rule,42 but concluded that the legislature, not the judiciary, was the more appropriate forum for change. 43
In State v. Ward,44 the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged
the procedural embarrassments sometimes caused by adherence to the
31. Id. at 159,368 N.E.2d at 1152 (quoting Schmidt v. State, 261 Ind. 81, 82-83, 300
N.E.2d 86, 87 (1973».
32. R. GILBERT & c. MOYLAN, MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 25-32 (1983); H. GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 10-12 (1940); L. HOCHHEIMER, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL
LAW AS ESTABLISHED IN THE STATE OF MARYLAND 5-6 (1889).
33. See State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 201-02, 396 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); Randall v.
Warden, 208 Md. 667, 670,119 A.2d 712, 714 (1956); Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15,45
(1873); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 289-90, 255 A.2d 470, 472 (1969); H.
GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 12
(1940); L. HOCHHEIMER, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AS ESTABLISHED IN THE
STATE OF MARYLAND 6 (1889).
34. State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189,205-06,396 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1978); Agresti v. State, 2
Md. App. 278, 281, 234 A.2d 284,286 (1967). The Maryland courts have indicated
their displeasure with the greater-crimes and sequence-of-trial rules. See, e.g., State
v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 204-05, 396 A.2d 1041, 1050 (1978) (suggesting that reason
does not support the greater-crimes rule); Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 218, 117
A.2d 549, 552 (1955) (quoting Bishop's characterization of the distinction between
an accessory before the fact and a principal as a "pure technicality"); Jeter v. State,
9 Md. App. 575, 582, 267 A.2d 319, 323 (1970) (expressing adherence to accessoryship rules based solely on deference to the legislature).
35. 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470 (1969).
36. Id. at 291, 255 A.2d at 473.
37. Id. at 291-92, 255 A.2d at 473.
38. Id. at 291, 255 A.2d at 473.
39. Id. at 301, 255 A.2d at 478.
40. Id. at 292, 255 A.2d at 473.
41. Id. at 298, 255 A.2d at 476.
42. Id. at 299, 255 A.2d at 477. The court enumerated procedural and substantive issues
that would require change in the event that the accessoryship rules were altered.
The procedural issues included where and under what circumstances an accessory
should be tried and under what circumstances an accessory should be tried absent
the trial of his principal. The substantive questions included issues regarding degrees
of culpability and the type of punishment most appropriate for a convicted accessory. Id. at 300, 255 A.2d at 477-78 (1969).
43. Id. at 300-01, 255 A.2d at 478 (1969).
44. 284 Md. 189,396 A.2d 1041 (1978).
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accessoryship rules,45 but still reaffirmed the greater-crimes rule. 46 In
Ward, the defendant was charged as an accessory before the fact to first
degree murder, even though the principals, in separate trials, pled guilty
to second degree murder. 47 The trial court dismissed the indictment,48
but the court of appeals concluded that the statutory nature of the indictment permitted the state to prosecute the defendant as an accessory
before the fact to second degree murder. 49 Thus, it reversed and remanded with the clear intent that the defendant only be convicted as an
accessory before the fact to second degree murder. 50 In its affirmation of
Maryland's adherence to the greater-crimes rule, the court extended the
rule's rationale to include statutorily created degrees of crime and held
that an accessory before the fact "may not be convicted of a higher degree of murder than that principal committing that murder."51
Lewis v. State 52 provided the factual circumstances needed to begin
the judicial reform of the accessoryship rules. In Lewis, the defendant
was convicted as an accessory before the fact to first degree murder and
related offenses. 53 In an earlier trial, the principal was tried and convicted of first degree murder, but he had not been sentenced prior to the
defendant's conviction. 54 Relying on the sequence-of-trial rule, 55 the defendant appealed. The court of appeals reversed the conviction 56 because
the principal had not been sentenced prior to the accessory's trial. 57
Nevertheless, after establishing its authority to modify the common law 58
and discounting any reason for the continuance of the accessoryship
rule,59 the court abrogated the sequence-of-trial rule and held prospectively that trials of accessories before or after the fact are not precluded
by the failure to try the principal. 60
Jones v. State 61 provided the Court of Appeals of Maryland with an
45. Id. at 192,396 A.2d at 1044; see State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286,255 A.2d 470
(1969) (affirming the dismissal of an accessory because the principal died prior to
conviction).
46. Id. at 206, 396 A.2d at 1051-52.
47. Id. at 192-93, 396 A.2d at 1044-45.
48. Id. at 193, 396 A.2d at 1045.
49. Id. at 200, 396 A.2d at 1048.
SO. Id. at 207-09, 396 A.2d at 1052-53.
51. Id. at 206, 396 A.2d at 1051-52 (emphasis in original).
52. 285 Md. 70S, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979).
53. Id. at 707, 404 A.2d at 1074.
54. Id. at 708, 404 A.2d at 1075.
55. Id. at 707, 404 A.2d at 1074.
56. Id. at 714, 404 A.2d at 1078.
57. Id. at 713, 404 A.2d at 1077.
58. Id. at 715, 404 A.2d at 1079. The court stated that it has a right to alter the common law when it "has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life." Id. at
715,404 A.2d at 1079 (quoting White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767
(1966».
59. Id. at 716, 404 A.2d at 1079.
60. Id. The court did, however, emphasize that the evidence presented at the accessory's
trial must be sufficient to establish the occurrence of a felony. Id.
61. 302 Md. 153, 486 A.2d 184 (1985).
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opportunity to reevaluate the greater-crimes rule in light of its Lewis decision. In Lewis, the court emphasized the illogic of shielding an accessory from punishment when there was overwhelming evidence of his
criminal complicity.62 By abrogating the sequence-of-trial rule, it permitted an accessory to be tried and convicted even though the principal had
not been tried or was never to be tried. In Jones, the defendant's appeal
of his first degree murder conviction was predicated, inter alia, on the
greater-crimes rule. 63 The court of appeals held that "an accessory before
the fact may be convicted of a greater crime or greater degree of crime
than that of which his principal was convicted."64
The Jones court relied heavily on its earlier Lewis analysis and holding. The court observed that the Lewis decision already had sanctioned
an accessory's greater-crimes conviction when the accessory was convicted of a crime, but the principal was never tried. 6S Within that context, the abrogation of the greater-crimes rule was a mere formalization
and slight extension of the practical effect of Lewis. In addition, the Jones
court acknowledged that the Lewis decision illogically made the application of the greater-crimes accessoryship rule contingent on the fortuitous
circumstance of which party to the crime was tried first. 66 Finally, the
Jones court, again borrowing from its Lewis rationale, argued that an
accessory should not be shielded from prosecution merely because the
principal entered a plea or was found guilty of a lesser crime by a separate jury. 67
Jones v. State took the predictable and necessary step of abrogating
the greater-crimes rule. The Jones analysis, however, would have been
considerably strengthened by an expanded discussion of the now obsolete
rationale for the accessory-principal classifications and concomitant procedural rules. As noted earlier, the statutory elimination of capital punishment for most felonious crimes obviated the need to protect
defendants from the ubiquity of the death penalty.68 In addition, the
existence of many sensible reasons for the principal's conviction of a
lesser crime than the accessory69 made it unnecessary to equate the accessory's culpability with the principal's conviction. 70 If the Jones court
62. Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 715, 404 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1979) (quoting State v.
Ward, 284 Md. 189, 396 A.2d 1041 (1978)).
63. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 153, 486 A.2d 184, 185 (1983).
64. Id. at 161, 486 A.2d at 189.
65. Id. at 160, 486 A.2d at 188.
66. /d. at 160-61, 486 A.2d at 188.
67. /d. at 161, 486 A.2d at 188.
68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Oaks v. People, 161 Colo. 561,424 P.2d 115 (1967) (accessory's greatercrimes conviction upheld when principal pled guilty to lesser crime); Combs v.
State, 260 Ind. 294, 295 N.E.2d 366 (1973) (upholding greater-crimes conviction
when principal pled guilty to lesser crime); State v. Stocksdale, 138 N.J. Super. 312,
350 A.2d 539 (1975) (conviction of accessory permitted when principal exonerated
by a defense specific to him).
70. Justice Holmes makes this point succinctly: It is revolting to have no better reason

1986]

Jones v. State

351

had strengthened its reasoning by reference to these indicia of obsolescence, it would have helped to counterbalance the court's virtual disregard for the consequences of its decision on the "appearance of
evenhandedness in the administration of justice."71 Although the jurisprudentially sophisticated observer might understand that an accessory
may be convicted of a greater crime than the principal, the relatively
unsophisticated public72 may not apprehend that possibility. The ostensible anomaly of a principal's conviction of manslaughter and his accessory's conviction for second degree murder seriously compromises the
appearance of justice.
Finally, the Jones court's judicial activism 73 leaves several important
accessoryship related issues unsettled. Of greatest significance is whether
it is proper to permit an accessory before the fact to first degree murder
to be sentenced to death, especially when the principal may be convicted
of a lesser crime or no crime at all. By failing to address the propriety of
such death sentencing for accessories before the fact,74 Jones fails to bar
the very harshness the common law accessoryship rules sought to
obviate.
The Jones court was correct to abrogate the greater-crimes rule.
The court's decision, however, left unanswered some questions posed by
the common law rules of accessoryship; therefore, it remains for the legislature to consider the broader picture. Because the original reasons for
the principal-accessory distinctions have become obsolete, the legislature
should follow the modern trend and abolish the classificatory distinctions. It would be unwise, however, to permit an accessory before the fact
to be sentenced to death, especially when the principal, could receive a

71.

72.
73.

74.

for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1108 (3d Cir. 1979) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
See Krasno, National Survey Examines Public Awareness of Judicial System, 67 JuDICATURE 309 (1984); Slonim, Public Doesn't Understand Justice System: Survey, 66
A.B.A.J. 1502, 1502-03 (1980).
Prior Maryland case law supports an activist role in abrogating or altering the common law. See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242,462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogates
common law interspousal immunity rule in negligence cases); Moxley v. Acker, 294
Md. 47, 447 A.2d 857 (1982) (eliminates element of force in a common law action of
forcible detainer); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981) (modifies
common law principle that prohibits waiving the right to be present at every stage of
a criminal trial by the defendant's attorney); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 404 A.2d
1073 (1979) (abrogates common law rule that an accessory before the fact cannot be
tried prior to the conviction and sentencing of the principal); Pope v. State, 284 Md.
309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (refused to recognize common law offense of misprision
of felony).
Maryland law provides for the death penalty for first degree murder. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 413(e)(1), (d)(7) (1957). But see Osborne v. State, 304 Md. 323,
332, 499 A.2d 170, 174 (1985) (proscribing the death penalty for accessories after
the fact to first degree murder).
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lesser penalty. In that instance, not only is the appearance of justice compromised, but the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions of the
eighth amendment are implicated. 75 Thus, the legislature should insulate
all accessories from capital punishment, but allow, in all other instances,
an accessory before the fact to be treated as a principal.
Michael Carlis

75. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional issues involved when an accessory is
sentenced to death, see Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories
and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17 (1979).

